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FeatureConsciousness is still a subject that divides scientific opinion on philosophical 
grounds. Does it exist in separation from cognitive processes? Are there 
different types and levels of consciousness? Does it exist in animals, and how 
can we tell? More and more features that we used to consider unique hallmarks 
of the conscious human mind are now also being recognised in animals ranging 
from chimpanzees to corvids. This opens up opportunities to study aspects of 
the conscious mind in animal models. Michael Gross reports. 
Elements of consciousness in animalsTheft prevention: When jays realise that they have been observed while hiding their food, they come 
back to the cache to hide it elsewhere. This is particularly common in jays who have themselves been 
food thieves, suggesting that they can take the perspective of the thief. (Photo: Nicola Clayton.)Temple Grandin, who shot to 
global fame as the titular heroine 
of Oliver Sacks’ case collection An 
Anthropologist on Mars, has had a 
highly successful career in academic 
studies of animal welfare, in spite 
of being diagnosed with autism. 
Combining insights from her work 
with animals and from her experience 
with autism, she has come to the 
conclusion that the autistic mind may 
be a step closer to that of non-human 
mammals, such as cattle, than the 
neurotypical human mind.
Grandin has successfully used 
her closeness to animals in both 
directions. Observing animals helped 
her understand her own mind, and 
her personal experience helped her to 
design animal handling facilities that 
are now widely used. She first brought 
up this topic in her book Thinking in 
Pictures in 1995. Most recently, she 
has summarised her thoughts on 
these matters in the book Animals in 
Translation, co-authored with Catherine 
Johnson and published in 2005. An 
HBO biopic, with Claire Danes playing 
Grandin, was released in 2010.
In an earlier essay on consciousness, 
published on her website in 1998, 
Grandin attempted to describe her 
particular type of consciousness, which 
does integrate input from all her sensory 
inputs, but does not lead to integration 
through language or connection 
with emotion. She argues that her 
consciousness is on the second level 
in a hierarchy of four steps, including: 
1) consciousness within one sensory 
system; 2) consciousness integrating 
all sensory systems; 3) consciousness 
linking all sensory systems with 
emotions; and 4) translating all 
this into thoughts processed in a 
symbolic language. Thus, in contrast 
to neurotypical humans, Grandin 
maintains that her perceptions, while 
fully integrated across sensory modes, 
do not connect to emotions and are not automatically translated into 
language. She has also described her 
consciousness as “thinking in pictures”.
Given the philosophical divisions 
over consciousness, people may 
disagree with her analysis, but 
breaking the problem down into 
different levels of connectivity 
between sensory signals, emotional 
states, and mental representations 
offers a useful handle by which to 
grasp the thorny question of whether and to what extent animals possess 
consciousness.
Corvids and children 
Another scientist who compares the 
minds of animals and humans is Nicola 
Clayton, who holds positions at the 
psychology and zoology departments 
at the University of Cambridge, where 
she works with children and birds, 
respectively. Studying social cognition 
in corvids (including jays, crows and 
rooks), the groups of Clayton and of 
her husband Nathan Emery identified 
behaviours that are typically associated 
with self-awareness and theory of mind 
in the development of young children. 
For instance, jays hiding their food 
take into account whether others may 
have been able to observe them doing 
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Free hugs: Juvenile bonobos will readily offer body contact to comfort peers in distress. In this 
photo taken at Òlola ya Bonoboó in the Democratic Republic of Congo, one juvenile embraces 
another who has just lost a fight. (Image courtesy of Zanna Clay.)so. If they conclude that another jay has 
knowledge of their cache, they come 
back after the observer has gone and 
retrieve their food to hide it in a different 
place. They are most likely to do so if 
they have experience of stealing food 
themselves. It takes a thief to know a 
thief, even among birds. 
This behaviour requires the ability 
to take the perspective of another 
individual, something that is clearly 
an element of consciousness. 
Psychologists often investigate this 
ability in children using the Sally-Anne 
experiment, which children only master 
at an age of four years on average. Only 
recently have researchers begun to 
implement this ability in humanoid robots 
(Curr. Biol. (2013), 23, R821–R823).
Christoph Teufel, Clayton, and 
James Russell at Cambridge have 
analysed the role of experience 
and theory of mind in two-year-olds 
and found that, even when they 
understood from their own experience 
that another person was unable to see 
(through a coloured mask), they did not correctly infer the knowledge state 
of that person (J. Cogn. Devel. (2013), 
doi:10.1080/15248372.2012.664591).
In some experiments that involve 
prediction of physical changes, such 
as the crows throwing pebbles into 
a pitcher to raise the water level and 
reach floating food, average children 
only match the intelligence of the 
corvids at age seven (PLoS One 2012, 
7, e40574; see also: Curr. Biol. (2011), 
21, R905–R907). While it may seem 
surprising that most children learn to 
predict another person’s mind earlier 
than the much simpler system of a jar 
of water, Clayton suggests that there 
may be cultural effects involved that 
still have to be investigated.
In any case, food-caching corvids 
clearly display behaviours that we 
tend to identify as symptoms of 
consciousness in human infants, thus 
have to be conscious to a certain 
extent. “The jays seem to be socially 
aware, given their experience projection 
skills that are a hallmark of theory of 
mind,” Clayton explains. “They also have episodic-like memory and can 
plan for the future. Such mental time-
travel abilities also rely on awareness, 
i.e autonoesis and chronesthesia,” she 
says, referring to an earlier study from 
her group showing that jays can plan 
their breakfast for the next morning 
(Curr. Biol. (2007), 17, 856–861).
Evolutionary biologists like to link 
these achievements in birds with 
the requirements of essential natural 
behaviours, for instance by assuming 
that using a stick as a tool would come 
more naturally to birds that collect 
sticks to build their nests. However, 
this interpretation has been somewhat 
undermined by a report from Alice 
Auersperg and colleagues, who 
observed spontaneous tool innovation 
in a captive Goffin’s cockatoo (Cacatua 
goffini). These birds roost in natural tree 
holes and have not been known to use 
tools in the wild (Curr. Biol. (2012), 22, 
R903–R904). Intelligent planning may be 
an ability even more widespread among 
birds than we realise now.
In December 2010, Clayton was 
awarded the Jean-Marie Delwart 
prize in Comparative and Evolutionary 
Neuroscience by the eponymous 
foundation, which then proceeded to 
hold a symposium on The Emergence 
of Consciousness in Animal and 
Human Behaviour, setting Clayton’s 
work in the context of studies with 
other species. The meeting was held at 
Brussels in October 2013.
Social canids
Most other researchers in the field 
of animal consciousness restrict 
themselves to mammals. Dogs and their 
wild relatives are particularly popular. 
Family dogs can easily be recruited for 
non-invasive psychology experiments, 
whereas the social consciousness of 
their wild relatives can be inferred from 
natural pack behaviour in the wild.
At the Brussels conference, Marc 
Bekoff from the University of Colorado 
at Boulder, USA, presented insights into 
perceptions of fairness among canids 
from his long-running field studies of 
coyotes in the Grand Teton National 
Park, near Jackson, Wyoming, US. When 
young coyotes or wolves play, they use 
various strategies to ensure fairness. They 
may limit their own strength, e.g. restrict 
the force of their bite, or even reverse 
roles, meaning that a dominant animal 
may roll over and expose its unprotected 
underside. This suggests that they, too, 
can to a certain extent explore what it’s 
like to be somebody else.
Magazine
R983The fundamental rules of fairness 
in coyotes’ playtime are: “Ask first, 
be honest, follow the rules, and admit 
you’re wrong.” Bekoff’s observations 
suggest that animals that fail to play 
by these rules will usually fail to form 
strong social bonds and will leave the 
pack when they grow up. As these lone 
animals are exposed to higher mortality 
rates, Bekoff suggests, the ability 
to engage in fair play has a direct 
advantage for evolutionary fitness.
Peter Pongrácz from Eötvös 
University at Budapest, Hungary, 
reported sociocognitive research with 
dogs conducted with Ádám Miklósi. In a 
recent paper, Miklósi’s group examined 
the response of dogs to behavioural 
interactions from other species by using 
robots as well as human partners in 
their experiments, in order to separate 
responses to the social behaviour 
as such from those to its physical 
embodiment. The experiments showed 
that the dogs soon began to form 
expectations regarding the behaviour 
of the robots, and that they recognised 
certain social aspects of it (PLoS One 
2013, 8, e72727).
Bonobo comforts
The animals that are genetically 
closest to our species, bonobo and 
chimpanzee, are also strong candidates 
for consciousness research. Zanna 
Clay and Frans de Waal from Emory 
University in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 
studied the consolation behaviour in 
young bonobos at a sanctuary in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci USA (2013), doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1316449110).
Having previously established that 
juvenile bonobos are more likely to 
comfort others than are adults and 
adolescents, the researchers have now 
found that those juvenile individuals 
who are good at controlling their own 
emotions will also be more likely to 
comfort peers in distress after a tantrum 
or after losing a fight. As the sanctuary 
where they studied bonobo behaviour 
harbours large numbers of juveniles 
orphaned by bushmeat hunters, the 
researchers could also establish that 
good emotional control and the ability 
to comfort others were more likely to 
occur in juveniles brought up by their 
own mothers than in orphans rescued 
and reared by humans.
The link between emotional control 
and sympathetic concern is well-
established in children. Finding it in 
bonobos as well, the authors argue, shows that we share important parts 
of our socio-emotional behavioural 
framework with our animal relatives.
At the Brussels symposium, de 
Waal put this research into the wider 
context of his research on empathy in 
primates and presented what he calls 
a ‘Russian doll’ model of how animals 
perceive others. Their perception, de 
Waal explained, ranges from a core 
mechanism of emotional linkage arising 
from a direct mapping of another’s 
behavioural state onto the subject’s 
representations. This Perception–Action 
Model, according to de Waal, provides 
the basis for higher levels in which there 
is an increasing distinction between self 
and other, so that the other is recognized 
as the source of felt emotions.
Closing the Brussels symposium, 
Daniel Dennett from Tufts University 
warned of the dangers of drawing 
sharp lines between some animals 
that are conscious like we are, 
and others that are just zombies. 
He suggested that consciousness 
emerges from the massive 
interconnectivity of complex brains.
Frans de Waal summarises the 
experience: “Most of the participants at 
the meeting approached consciousness 
by evaluating capacities in animals 
that we associate with consciousness, 
such as mirror self recognition, time 
travel, insight learning, empathy 
and perspective-taking, and so on. 
So, instead of trying to demonstrate 
consciousness per se, we were looking 
for circumstantial evidence assuming 
that, if certain capacities engage 
consciousnesses in humans, then they 
probably also do in other species. We 
reviewed evidence from invertebrates 
and fish to birds and mammals, truly 
across the spectrum.”
These considerations seem to 
suggest that there is a consciousness 
spectrum, even more finely graded 
than the four steps that Temple Grandin 
suggested in the 1990s, on which 
various animals may display distinct 
features of consciousness.
Rather than searching for a whole 
consciousness package, which may be 
as futile as earlier attempts at finding the 
seat of the soul, it may prove worthwhile 
for researchers to study those features 
separately, in the hope that they will 
later fit together into a meaningful 
understanding of human consciousness.
Michael Gross is a science writer based at 
Oxford. He can be contacted via his web 
page at www.michaelgross.co.ukQ & A
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Why did you choose to study 
biology in the first place? I did not. 
I wanted to become an electrical 
engineer. As a young radio ham my 
goal was to establish effective Earth–
Moon–Earth radio communication; 
but, given the expense of studying 
